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Abstract: In this paper paraconsistent first-order logic LP# with infinite hierarchy
levels of contradiction is proposed. Corresponding paraconsistent set theory KSth# is
proposed. Axiomatical system HST# ,as inconsistent generalization of Hrbacek set
theory HST is considered.
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List of designations
VCon - consistent universum
VInc - inconsistent universum
U - complete universum U  VConVInc
   - relation of the classical consistent equivalence
 s  - relation of the strong consistent nonclassical equivalence or
s-equivalence
 s   VCon    
 ∈  - classical consistent membership relation
 ∈s  - strong consistent membership relation or s-membership relation
 ∈s   VCon   ∈ 
 w  - relation of the weak equivalence or w-equivalence
 w   VCon    
 w1  - relation of the weak inconsistent equivalence order 1 or w1-equivalence
 w1  ↔  w  ∧  ≠w 
 wn  - relation of the weak inconsistent equivalence order n or wn-equivalence
 ∈w  - weak membership relation or w-membership relation
 ∈w1  weak inconsistent membership relation order 1 or w1-membership relation
w-weak empty set
I.Introduction.
The real history of non-Aristotelian logic begins on May 18,1910 when N.A.
Vasiliev presented to the Kazan University faculty a lecture "On Partial Judgements,
the Triangle of Opposition, the Law of Excluded Fourth" [Vasiliev 1910] to satisfy the
requirements for obtaining the title of privat-dozent. In this lecture Vasiliev expounded
for the first time the key principles of non-Aristotelian, imaginary, logic. In this work he
likewise constructed his "imaginary" logic free of the laws of contradiction and
excluded middle in the informal, so-to-speak Aristotelian, manner (although imaginary
logic is in essense non- Aristotelian).Thus the birthday of new logic was exactly fixed
in the annals of history. Vasiliev’s reform of logic was radical, and he did his best to
determine whether it was possible for the new logic with new laws and new subject to
imply a new logical Universe. Vasiliev began the modern non-classical revolution in
logic, but he certainly did not complete it. The founder of paraconsistent logic, N.A.
Vasiliev, stated as a characteristic feature of his logic, three kinds of sentence, i.e. "S
is A", "S is not A", "S is and is not A". Thus Vasiliev logic rejected the law of
non-contradiction: A ∧ A and the law of excluded middle: A ∨ A.However
Vasiliev’s logic preserve the law of excluded fourth: A ∨ A ∨A ∧ A. Possible
formalized versions of Vasiliev’s logic with one level of contradiction LP1# was
proposed by A.I.Arruda [1]. In this paper we proposed paraconsistent first-order logic
LP# with infinite hierarchy levels of contradiction. Corresponding paraconsistent set
theory KSth# is discussed.
The postulates (or their axioms schemata) of Vasiliev-Amida propositional
paraconsistent logic VA1 are the following:
The language ℒ1 of paraconsistent logic VA1  VA1V has as
primitive symbols (i) countable set of a clalassical propositional variables, (ii)
countable set V  P ii∈ℕ of a non clalassical propositional variables,(iii) the
connectives , ,∧,∨,→ and (iv) the parentheses (,).
I. Logical postulates:
1 A → B → A,
2 A → B → A → B → C → A → C,
3 A → B → A ∧ B,
4 A ∧ B → A,
5 A ∧ B → B,
6 A → A ∨ B,
7 B → A ∨ B,
6 A → A ∨ B,
7 B → A ∨ B,
8 A → C → B → C → A ∨ B → C,
9 A ∨ A,
10 B → B → A if B ∉ V.
II.Rules of a conclusion:
Anrestricted Modus Ponens ruleMP : A,A → B  B.
Theorem 1.1.[1]. (1) If B ∉ V, then B,B  A; (2) A ↔ A iff A ∉ V;
(3) A → A.
The postulates (or their axioms schemata) of Vasiliev-Amida propositional
paraconsistent logic VA2 are the following:
The language ℒ2 of paraconsistent logic VA2  VA2V has as
primitive symbols (i) countable set of a clalassical propositional variables, (ii)
countable set V  P ii∈ℕ of a non clalassical propositional variables,(iii) the
connectives , ,∧,∨,→ and (iv) the parentheses (,).
I. Logical postulates:
1 A → B → A,
2 A → B → A → B → C → A → C,
3 A → B → A ∧ B,
4 A ∧ B → A,
5 A ∧ B → B,
6 A → A ∨ B,
7 B → A ∨ B,
6 A → A ∨ B,
7 B → A ∨ B,
8 A → C → B → C → A ∨ B → C,
9 A ∨ A,
10 B → B → A if B ∉ V,
11 Pi ∧ P i iff Pi∈ V, i  1,2, . . . .
II.Rules of a conclusion:
Anrestricted Modus Ponens ruleMP : A,A → B  B.
II.Paraconsistent Logic with n levels of contradiction LPn#.
Modern formalized versions of Vasiliev’s logic with one level of contradiction may
be found in Amida [1980], [Puga and Da Costa 1988], Smimov [Smirnov 1987], and
[Smimov 1987a, 161-169]. There is also the presentation Smimov given at the
International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science in Uppsala in
1991.
Paraconsistent Logic with one levels of contradiction LP1#.
Let us consider now Vasiliev-Amida type paraconsistent logic LP1#  LP1#V,Δ with
one level of contradiction.
The postulates (or their axioms schemata) of propositional paraconsistent logic
LP1# are the following:
The language ℒ1# of paraconsistent logic LP1#  LP1#V,Δ has as
primitive symbols (i) countable set of a clalassical propositional variables, (ii)
countable set V  P ii∈ℕ of a non clalassical propositional variables, (iii) the
connectives w,s,∧,∨,→ and (iv) the parentheses (,).
Remark.2.1.We distinguish a weak negation w and a strong negation s.
The definition of formula is the usual. We denote the set of the all formulae of
LP1#V1,Δ by ℱ1#, where V1  V0  V1 and Δ is a given subset of ℱ1#. Here we
used the following definitions: V0  V,V1  1 | ∈ V,1   ∧ w. A,B,C,
... will be used as metalanguage variables which indicate formulas of LP1#V,Δ. We
assume through that V1⊂ Δ  ℱ1#.
I. Logical postulates:
1 A → B → A,
2 A → B → A → B → C → A → C,
3 A → B → A ∧ B,
4 A ∧ B → A,
5 A ∧ B → B,
6 A → A ∨ B,
7 B → A ∨ B,
8 A → C → B → C → A ∨ B → C,
9 P i ∧ wP i iff Pi∈ V, i  1,2, . . .
10 A ∨ wA iff A ∉ V,
11 B → wB → A if B ∉ V1,
12 A ∨ wA ∨A ∧wA iff A ∈ V1,
13 A ∨ sA if A ∈ ℱ1#,
14 B → sB → A if A,B ∈ ℱ1#.
II.Rules of a conclusion:
Restricted Modus Ponens ruleMPR :
A,A → B  B iff A ∉ Δ.
Unrestricted Modus Tollens rules: P → Q,wQ  wP;P → Q,sQ  sP.
The rule of a strong contradiction: A ∧ sA  B.
III.Quantification
Corresponding to the propositional paraconsistent relevant logic LP1#V,Δ we
construct the corresponding paraconsistent relevant first-order predicate calculus
LP1
#  LP1# Ṽ, Δ̃ . The language of the paraconsistent predicate calculus LP1#,
denoted by ℒ1#, is an extension of the language ℒ1# introduced above, by adding, as
usually,for every m, denumerable families of m-ary predicate symbols
R1m,R2m, . . . ,Rnm, . . . ,and m-ary function symbols f1m, f2m, . . . , fnm, . . . , and the universal ∀ and
existential ∃ quantifiers.
We assume throughout that: the language ℒ1# contains also
(i) the classical numerals 0,1,… ;
(ii) countable set Γ of the classical consistent set variables Γ  x,y, z, . . . ;
(iii) countable set Γ̆ of the non classical inconsistent set variables Γ̆  x̆, y̆, z̆, . . . ;
(iv) countable set Θ of the classical non-logical constants Θ  a,b,c. . . ;
(iv) countable set Θ̆ of the non classical non-logical constants Θ̆  ă, b̆, c̆. . . ;
Definition 2.1. An LP1
# wff  (well-formed formula ) is a LP1#- sentence iff it hasn’t
free variables; a wff Ψ is open if it has free variables. We’ll use the slang ‘k – place
open wff’ to mean a wff with k distinct free variables.
Definition 2.2. An LP1
# wff  is a classical iff it hasn’t non classical variables and
non classical constants.
Definition 2.3. An LP1
# wff  is a non classical iff it has an non classical variables
or non classical constants.We denote the set of the all formulae of LP1
# Ṽ, Δ̃ by
ℱ1#, where Ṽ ⊃ V1 and Δ̃ ⊃ Δ is a given subsets of ℱ1#.We assume through that
Ṽ ⊂ Δ̃  ℱ1#.
The postulates of LP1
# Ṽ, Δ̃ are those of LP1# Ṽ, Δ̃ (suitably adapted) plus the
following:
(I)  → x → ∀xx ,
(II) ∀xx → y,
(III) x → ∃xx,
(IV) x → ∃xx →  ,
(V) ∀xx1 → ∀xx1,
(VI) ∀xx1 → ∃xx1,
(VII) ∀xx1 → ∀xx ∧ ∀xwx,
(VIII) ∀xx1 → ∃xx ∧ ∃xwx,
where we used the following definitions:
0  ,1  w ∧ w and
0  ,1   ∧ w
and where the variables x and y and the formulas  and  satisfy the usual
definition.
From the calculi LP1
# Ṽ, Δ̃ ,one can construct the following predicate calculus with
equality. This is done by adding to their languages the binary predicates symbol of
strong equality    or  s  and weak equality w  with suitable modifications
in the concept of formula, and by adding the following postulates:
(IX) ∀xx s x,
(X) ∀x∀y x s y1  B ,
(XI) ∀x∀yx s y → x ↔ y,
(XII) ∀x∀y∀zx s y ∧ y s z → x s z,
(XIII) ∀y∃xy w x,
(XIV) ∀y∃xy w x1,
(XV) ∀x∀yx w y → x ↔ y
(XVI) ∀x∀y x w y1 ↔ 1x ↔ 1y ,
(XVII) ∀x∀y∀zx w y ∧ y w z → x w z,
(XVIII) ∀x∀y∀z x w y1 ∧ y w z1 → x w z1 ,
(XIX) ∀x∀y∀zx w y ∧ y s z → x w z,
(XX) ∀x∀y∀z x w y1 ∧ y s z → x w z1 ,
(XXI) ∀x∀y∀zx s y ∧ y w z → x w z,
(XXII) ∀x∀y∀z x s y ∧ y w z1 → x w z1 .
II.Rules of a conclusion:
Restricted Modus Ponens ruleMPR :
A,A → B  B iff A ∉ Δ̃.
Unrestricted Modus Tollens rules: P → Q,wQ  wP;P → Q,sQ  sP.
The rule of a strong contradiction: A ∧ sA  B.
Definition 2.4. Classical V-object ℑCl  ℑCl Ṽ, Δ̃ is the object such that from any
classical formula of the form PℑCl ∧ wPℑCl,where PℑNCl ∉ Δ̃ by using principles
as in paraconsistent logical calculas LP1
# Ṽ, Δ̃ using Restricted Modus Ponens rule,
one can deduce any formula i.e., classical object ℑCl is the object which hasn’t any
inconsistent property with respect to a weak negation w.
Definition 2.5. Non classical V-object ℑNCl  ℑNCl Ṽ, Δ̃ of the 1-degree of
inconsistency is the object ℑNCl such that: from any non classical formula of the form
PℑNCl ∧ wPℑNCl,where PℑNCl ∉ Δ̃ by using principles as in paraconsistent
logical calculas LP1
# Ṽ, Δ̃ using Restricted Modus Ponens rule one can’t deduce any
formula whatsoever i.e., non classical object of the 1-degree of inconsistency is the
object ℑNCl which has at least one inconsistent property of the 1-degree with respect
to a weak negation w.
The simplest example of non classical objects 1-degree inconsistency is
inconsistent numbers ă such that
ă w 1 ∧ wă w 1, 2.1
or
b̆ w 1 ∧ b̆ w 2 . 2.2
Remark.2.2. Note that: (i) formula (2.1) meant that ă w 1 ∈ Ṽ and (ii) formula
(2.2) meant that b̆ w 1 ∈ Δ̃ and b̆ w 2 ∈ Δ̃.
Paraconsistent Logic with n levels of contradiction LPn#.
Let us consider now paraconsistent logic LPn#  LPn#V,Δ with n levels of
contradiction.
The postulates (or their axioms schemata) of propositional paraconsistent logic
LPn#  LPn# V̂, Δ̂ are the following:
The language ℒn# of paraconsistent logic LPn# has as primitive symbols (i) countable
set of a clalassical propositional variables, (ii) countable set V  P ii∈ℕ of a non
clalassical propositional variables, (iii) the connectives w,s,∧,∨,→ and (iv) the
parentheses (,).
Remark 2.3.We distinguish a weak negation w and a strong negation s.
The definition of formula is the usual. We denote the set of the all formulae of
LPn# V̂, Δ̂ by ℱn# where V̂ and Δ̂ is a given subsets of ℱn#. We assume through
that V̂ ⊂ Δ̂  ℱn#.
A,B,C, ... will be used as metalanguage variables which indicate formulas of
LPn# V̂, Δ̂ .
Definition 2.6. (i) k stands for k−1 ∧ k−11, where 0  ,
1  w ∧ w, 0 ≤ k ≤ n.
(ii) the (finite) k-order of the level of a weak consistency (w-consistency) is:
k, 0 ≤ k ≤ n.
Definition 2.7. (i) k stands for k−1 ∧ k−11, where 0  ,
1   ∧ w, 0 ≤ k ≤ n.
(ii) the (finite) k-order of the level of a weak inconsistency (w-inconsistency) is:
n, 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
I. Logical postulates:
1 A → B → A,
2 A → B → A → B → C → A → C,
3 A → B → A ∧ B,
4 A ∧ B → A,
5 A ∧ B → B,
6 A → A ∨ B,
7 B → A ∨ B,
8 A → C → B → C → A ∨ B → C,
9 P ∧ wP iff P ∈ V,
10 Pk iff P ∈ V,
11 A ∨ wA if A ∉ V̂ 
k0
n
Vk. ,
12 A ∨ sA if A ∈ ℱn#,
13 B → sB → A if A,B ∈ ℱn#,
14 A ∨ wA∨A ∧ wA ∨ A2
n−1
∨. . .∨Ak ∨. . .∨ An if A ∈ ℱn#,
15 B → wB → A if B ∉ V̂ 
k0
n
Vk.
II.Rules of a conclusion:
Restricted Modus Ponens ruleMPR :
A,A → B  B iff A ∉ V̂.
Unrestricted Modus Tollens rule: P → Q,wQ  wP;P → Q,sQ  sP.
The rule of a strong contradiction: A ∧ sA  B.
III.Quantification
Corresponding to the propositional paraconsistent relevant logic LPn# V̂ we
construct the corresponding paraconsistent relevant first-order predicate calculus.
These new calculus will be denoted by LPn
# V̂ .
The postulates of LPn
# V̂ are those of LPn# V̂ (suitably adapted)
plus the following:
(I)  → x → ∀xx ,
(II) ∀xx → y,
(III) x → ∃xx,
(IV) x → ∃xx →  ,
(V) ∀xxk → ∀xxk,k  1,2, . . . ,n,
(VI) ∀xxk → ∃xxk,k  1,2. . . ,n,
(VII) ∀xxk → ∀xxk,k  1,2. . . ,n.
From the calculus LPn
# V̂ ,we can construct the following predicate calculus with
equality.This is done by adding to their languages the binary predicates symbol of
strong equality    or  s  and weak equality w  with suitable
modifications in the concept of formula, and by adding the following postulates:
(IX) ∀xx s x,
(X) ∀x x s x1  B ,
(XI) ∀x∀yx s y → x ↔ y,
(XII) ∀x∀y∀zx s y ∧ y s z → x s z,
(XIII) ∀y∃xx w xk,k  0,1,2, . . . ,n,
(XIV) ∀x∀y x w yk ↔ ∀∘kx ↔ ky ,k  1,2, . . . ,n,
(XV) ∀x∀y∀z x w yk ∧ y w zk → x w zk ,k  0,1,2, . . . ,n,
(XVI ∀x∀y∀z x w yk ∧ y s z → x w zk ,k  0,1,2, . . . ,n,
(XVII) ∀x∀y∀z x s y ∧ y w zk → x w zk ,k  0,1,2, . . . ,n,
(XVIII) ∀y∃xy w xk,k  0,1,2, . . . ,n.
III. Paraconsistent Logic with infinite hierarchy levels of
contradiction LP# .
The postulates (or their axioms schemata) of propositional paraconsistent logic
LP#  LP# V̂, Δ̂ are the following:
The language ℒ# of paraconsistent logic LP# has as primitive symbols (i)
countable set of a clalassical propositional variables, (ii) countable set V  P ii∈ℕ of a
non clalassical propositional variables, (iii) the connectives w,s,∧,∨,→ and (iv) the
parentheses (,).
Remark.3.1.We distinguish a weak negation w and a strong negation s.
The definition of formula is the usual. We denote the set of the all formulae of
LP# V̂, Δ̂ by ℱ# where V̂ and Δ̂ is a given subsets of ℱ# . We assume through
that V̂ ⊂ Δ̂  ℱ# .
A,B,C, ... will be used as metalanguage variables which indicate formulas of
LP# V̂, Δ̂ .
Definition 3.1. (i) n stands for n−1 ∧ n−11, where
0  ,1  w ∧ w, 1 ≤ n  .
(ii)  stands for ∀nn .
(iii) the finite n-order of the level of a weak consistency (w-consistency) is:
0  ,n, 1 ≤ n  .
(iv) the ifinite -order of level of a weak consistency (w-consistency) is : .
Definition 3.2. (i) n stands for n−1 ∧ n−10,
where 0   ∧ w, 1 ≤ n  .
(ii)  stands for ∀nn .
(iii) the finite n-order of the level of a weak inconsistency (w-inconsistency) is:
n, 1 ≤ n  .
(iv) the ifinite -order of the level of a weak inconsistency (w-inconsistency) is: .
I. Logical postulates:
1 A → B → A,
2 A → B → A → B → C → A → C,
3 A → B → A ∧ B,
4 A ∧ B → A,
5 A ∧ B → B,
6 A → A ∨ B,
7 B → A ∨ B,
8 A → C → B → C → A ∨ B → C,
9 P i ∧ wP i iff Pi∈ V, i  1,2, . . . ,
10 Pin iff Pi∈ V, i  1,2, . . . ; 1 ≤ n  ,
11 A ∨ wA if A ∉ V̂ 
k∈ℕ
Vk,
12 A ∨ sA if A ∈ℱ# ,
14 B → sB → A if A,B ∈ ℱ# ,
15 A ∨ wA ∨ A1 ∨ A2
n
∨. . .∨ An if A ∈ ℱ# , 1 ≤ n  ,
16 B → wB → A if B ∉ V̂  
k∈ℕ
Vk.
II.Rules of a conclusion:
Restricted Modus Ponens ruleMPR :
A,A → B  B iff A ∉ V̂.
Unrestricted Modus Tollens rule: P → Q,wQ  wP;P → Q,sQ  sP.
The rule of a strong contradiction: A ∧ sA  B.
III.Quantification
Corresponding to the propositional paraconsistent relevant logic LP# V̂ we
construct the corresponding paraconsistent relevant first-order predicate calculus.
These new calculus will be denoted by LP
# V̂ .
The postulates of LP
# V̂ are those of LP# V̂ (suitably adapted)
plus the following:
(I)  → x → ∀xx ,
(II) ∀xx → y,
(III) x → ∃xx,
(IV) x → ∃xx →  ,
(V) ∀xxn → ∀xxn, 1 ≤ n  ,
(VI) ∀xxn → ∃xxn, 1 ≤ n  ,
(VII) ∀xxn → ∀xxn, 1 ≤ n  , . .
From the calculus LP
# V̂ ,we can construct the following predicate calculus with
equality.This is done by adding to their languages the binary predicates symbol of
strong equality    or  s  and weak equality w  with suitable
modifications in the concept of formula, and by adding the following postulates:
(IX) ∀xx s x,
(X) ∀x x s x1  B ,
(XI) ∀x∀yx s y → x ↔ y,
(XII) ∀x∀y∀zx s y ∧ y s z → x s z,
(XIII) ∀y∃xx w xn, 0 ≤ n  ,
(XIV) ∀x∀y x w yn ↔ ∀∘nx ↔ ny , 1 ≤ n  ,
(XV) ∀x∀y∀z x w yn ∧ y w zn → x w zn , 0 ≤ n  ,
(XVI) ∀x∀y∀z x w yn ∧ y s z → x w zn , 0 ≤ n  ,
(XVII) ∀x∀y∀z x s y ∧ y w zn → x w zn , 0 ≤ n  ,
(XVIII) ∀y∃xy w xn, 0 ≤ n  .
IV. Paraconsistent set theory KSth#
Cantor’s "naive" set theory KSth was based mainly on two fundamental principles:
the postulate of extensionality (if the sets x and y have the same elements, then they
are equal), and the postulate of comprehension or separation (every property
determines a set, composed of the objects that have this property). The latter
postulate, in the standard (first-order) language of set theory, becomes the following
schema of formulas:
∃y∀xx ∈ y ↔ Fx,y. 4.1
Now, it is enough to replaces the formula Fx,y in (4.1) by x ∉ x to derive Russell’s
paradox. That is, the principle of comprehension (4.1) entails an inconsistency. Thus,
if one adds (4.1) to classical first-order logic, conceived as the logic of a set-theoretic
language, a trivial theory is obtained.
Remark.4.1.We distinguish a weakly inconsisten membership relation ∘ ∈w ∘ and
a strongly consisten membership relation∘ ∈s ∘.
Definition 4.1. (i) the minimal order of the level of a weak
consistency (w-consistency) is: 1  0 ∧ w0 ∧ w0,0    x ∈w y;
(ii) the minimal order of the level of a weak inconsistency (w -inconsistency) is:
1  0 ∧ w0,0    x ∈w y.
Definition 4.2.(i) x ∈w,n y is to stands for x ∈w yn and is to
mean "x is a weakly consistent member of y of the n-order (of the n-level) of
w-consistency ".
(ii) x ∈w,n y is to stands for x ∈w yn and is to mean "x is a weakly
inconsistent member of y of the n-order (of the n-level) of w-inconsistency ".
Definition 4.1. An LP1
# wff  is a w-wff iff it does not contain the connective: w.
We now replace the formula (4.1) by formulae
∃y∀xx ∈w,n y ↔ Fx,y ,
n  0,1,2, . . . 4.2
and
∃y∀xx ∈w,n y ↔ Fx,y,
n  0,1,2, . . . . 4.3
Theorem 4.1. (1) The collections n  ∀xx ∈w,n n↔wx ∈w,n x is
contradictory of the n  1-order of w-inconsistency.
(2) The collections n  ∀xx ∈w,n n↔wx ∈w,n x is
contradictory of the n  1-order of w-inconsistency.
Theorem 4.2. (1) The collection   ∀x∀nx ∈w,n ↔wx ∈w,n x is
contradictory of the   1-order of w-inconsistency.
(2) The collection   ∀x∀nx ∈w,n ↔wx ∈w,n x is
contradictory of the   1-order of w-inconsistency.
The standard non-classical response to these paradoxes is to find fault with the
logical and deduction principles involved in the deduction. Most standard approaches
to the paradoxes take them to be important lessons in the behaviour of a Boolean
negation.
However if you wish to define negation non-classically, there are many options
available.You can define negation inferentially, taking A to mean that if A, then
something absurd follows,or it can be defined by way of the equivalence between the
truth of ~A and the falsity of A, and allowing truth and falsity to have rather more
independence from one another than is usually taken to be the case: say, allowing
statements to be neither true nor false, or both true and false. The former account
takes truth as primary, and defines negation in terms of a rejected proposition and
implication.
For example, one can to define a strong negation ~sA non-classically [16]:
~sA  A → ∀x∀yx ∈w y ∧ x s y. 4.4
Theorem 4.3. The collection ~s such that x ∈w ~s↔~sx ∈w x i.e.,
~s  x̂~sx ∈w x is contradictory.
Proof. Replace Fx,y in the axiom schema of abstraction (4.2) in the
definition of collection by ~sx ∈w x, so that the implicit definition of ~s
becomes
x ∈w ~s↔~sx ∈w x. 4.5
Instantiating in (4.5) x by ~s then by unrestricted modus pones MP,
we obtain:
(1)  ~s∈w~s↔ ~s~s∈w~s .
By unrestricted modus ponesMP one obtain the contradiction
(2)  ~s∈w~s∧~s~s∈w~s .
Thus, if we adds (4.2)-(4.3) to first-order logic LP
# V̂, Δ̂ , conceived as the logic
of a set-theoretic language with suitable adapted V̂ and Δ̂ a nontrivial paraconsistent
set theory KSth# is obtained.
V. Generalized Incompleteness Theorems.
5.1. Let Th be some fixed, but unspecified, paraconsistent, i.e. inconsistent but
nontrivial formal theory and in these case we wrote PTh or PconPTh instead Th. For
later convenience, we assume that the encoding is done in some fixed consistent
formal theory S and that PTh contains S. We do not specify S— it is usually taken to
be a formal system of arithmetic, although a weak set theory is often more convenient.
The sense in which S is contained in PTh is better exemplified than explained: If S is a
formal system of arithmetic and PTh is, say, ZFn, 1  n   or ZFC# then PTh
contains S in the sense that there is a well-known embedding, or interpretation, of S in
PTh.Since encoding is to take place in S, it will have to have a large supply of
constants and closed terms to be used as codes. (E.g. in formal arithmetic, one has
0,1,... .) S will also have certain function symbols to be described shortly.
To each formula , of the language of PTh is assigned a closed term, c, called
the code of . [N.B. If x is a formula with free variable x, then xc is a closed
term encoding the formula x with x viewed as a syntactic object and not as a
parameter.] Corresponding to the logical connectives and quantifiers are function
symbols, neg, imp, etc., such that, for all formulae , : S 
negnc  nc, S  impc, c   → c, etc. Of
particular importance is the substitution operator sub, represented by the function
symbol sub, . For formulae x, terms t with codes tc :
S  subxc, tc  tc. 5.1
Iteration of the substitution operator sub allows one to define function symbols sub3,
sub4, . . . , such that
S  subnx1,x2, . . . ,xnc, t1 c, t2 c, . . . , tn c  t1, t2, . . . , tnc. 5.2
It well known [17] that one can also encode derivations and have a binary relation
ProvThx,y (read "x proves y " or "x is a proof of y") such that for closed t1, t2 :
S  ProvTht1, t2 iff t1 is the code of a derivation in PTh of the formula with code
t2.It follows that
PTh   iff S  ProvPTht, c 5.3
for some closed term t.
Definition 5.1.Thus one can define
PrPThy ↔ ∃xProvPThx,y, 5.4
and therefore one obtain a predicate asserting provability.
Remark 5.1. We note that it is not always the case that :
PTh   iff S  PrPThc. 5.5
It well known [17] that the above encoding can be carried out in such a way that the
following important conditions D1,D2 and D3 are met for all sentences [17]:
D1.PTh   implies S  PrPThc,
D2.S  PrPThc → PrPThPrPThcc,
D3.S  PrPThc ∧ PrPTh → c → PrPThc.
5.6
Generalized Incompleteness Theorems depend on the following.
Theorem 5.1. (Diagonalization Lemma). Let x in the language of PTh have only
the free variable indicated. Then there is a sentence  such that
S   ↔ c. 5.7
Proof. Given x, let x ↔ subx,x be the diagonalization of x. Let
m  xc and   m. Then we claim that S   ↔ c.For x in S, we see
that
 ↔ m ↔ subm,m ↔ subxc,m ↔ mc ↔ c. 5.8
We apply now (5.7) to nPrThx.
Theorem 5.2. (Generalized First Incompleteness Theorem).Let (1) PconnTh and
(2) Th  ↔ nPrThc.
Then (i)
Th  , 5.9
(ii) under an additional assumption
Th  n. 5.10
Proof. (i) Observe Th  implies Th  PrThc by D1, which implies Th  n,
contradicting the paraconsistency of Th.
(ii) The additional assumption is a strengthening of the converse to D1, namely
Th  PrThc implies Th .We have Th  n,hence Th  nnPrThc so
that Th  PrThc and, by the additional assumption,Th  , again contradicting the
paraconsistency of Th.
Theorem 5.3. (Generalized Second Incompleteness Theorem).
Let PconnTh be nPrThn c,where n  A ∧ nA is any convenient
n-contradictory statement. Then
Th  PconnTh. 5.11
Proof. Let  be as in the statement of Theorem 5.2.. We show: S 
 ↔ PconnTh. Observe that S   → nPrThc implies S 
 → nPrThn c, since S   → n implies S  PrTh → n c,by D1, which
implies S  PrThn c → PrThc,by D3. But  → nPrThn c is just
 → PconnTh and we have proven half of the equivalence. Conversely, by D2,S 
PrThc → PrThPrThcc , which implies S  PrThc → → PrThnc,by
D1,D3, since  → nPrThc.This yields S  PrTh ∧ nc, by D1,D3, and
logic, which implies S  PrThc → PrThn c by D1,D3, and logic. By
contraposition, S  nPrThn c → nPrThc,which is S PconnTh → , by
definitions.
Theorem 5.4. S  PconnTh → Pconn Th  nPconnTh .
Proof.By the proof of Theorem 5.3, (i) S  PconnTh → nPrThc,
(ii) S  PconnTh ↔ .Using now D2,D3, it follows that
S  PconnTh → nPrThPconnThc,so that
S PconnTh → nPrThnPconnTh → n c 5.12
which gives S  PconnTh → Pconn Th  nPconnTh .
Definition 5.2.Define: (i)
ProvTh x,y ↔ ProvThx,y ∧
∧∀zw ≤ xProvThz,w → y ≠ negnw ∧ w ≠ negny
5.13
(ii)
PrTh y ↔ ∃xProvTh x,y 5.14
and
(iii)
Pconn Th ↔ PrTh n c. 5.15
Theorem 5.5. (Generalized Rossers Theorem).Let (1) PconnTh and
(2) Th  ↔ nPrTh c.
Then (i)
Th  , 5.16
(ii)
Th  n. 5.17
(iii)
Th  Pconn Th. 5.18
Proof.(i) By the paraconsistency of Th, ProvTh and ProvTh binumerate the same
relation. Hence D1 holds: Th   Th  PrTh c.Thus, the proof of the first part
of the First Incompleteness Theorem yields the result.
(ii) This follows from (iii).
(iii) Follows immediately from the remarks that Th is paraconsistent and
Th  nn.
Theorem 5.6. (Generalized Löb’s Theorem). Let be (1) PconnTh and (2)  be
closed. Then
Th  PrThc →  iff Th  . 5.19
Proof. The one direction is obvious. For the other, assume that Th  . Then
Th  n is consistent and we may appeal to the Generalized Second
Incompleteness Theorem to conclude that Th  n does not yield
PconnTh  n, hence not nPrTh → n c. Thus Th 
n  nPrThc.Contraposition yields Th  PrThc → .
Let be PconnTh.Now we focuses our attention on the following schemata:
(I) Generalized Local Reflection Principle RfnTh :
PrThc → ,  closed. 5.20
(II) Generalized First Uniform Reflection Principle RFNTh :
∀xPrThxc → ∀xx, x has only x free. 5.21
(III) Generalized Second Uniform Reflection Principle RFN′Th :
∀xPrThxc → xx, x has only x free. 5.22
Theorem 5.7. (Generalized First Incompleteness Theorem).Let be PconnTh.Then
for some true, unprovable 
Th  PrThc →  5.23
Theorem 5.8. (Generalized Second Incompleteness Theorem).Let be
PconnTh.Then for any refutable 
Th  PrThc →  5.24
Theorem 5.6 simply yields
Th  PrThc →  iff Th , 5.25
VI. Set theory HST# .
VI.1.Axiomatical system HST# ,as inconsistent
generalization of Hrbacek set theory HST.
In this chapter we introduces HST# , inconsistent generalization of Hrbacek set
theory HST and describes the basic structure of the HST# set universe. Syntactically,
HST# is a theory in the sts-∈s -stw-∈w -language, which contains: (1) a binary
consistent predicate of strong or consistent membership ∈s and consistent unary
predicate of strong or consistent standardness sts (and strong or consistent equality
s of course) as the consistent primary notions and (2) a binary inconsistent predicate
of weak or inconsistent membership ∈w and inconsistent unary predicate of weak or
inconsistent standardness stw (and weak or inconsistent equality w of course) as the
inconsistent primary notions. Formula x ∈w y reads: x weakly belongs to y, or x is an
weak element of y, with the usual set theoretic understanding of inconsistent
membership. The formula stwx reads: x is a weakly standard, its meaning will be
explained below. A sts-∈s -stw-∈w -formula is a formula of the sts-∈s -stw-∈w -language.
An ∈w -formula is a formula of the ∈w -language having ∈w as the only atomic
predicate. Thus an ∈w -formula is a stw-∈w -formula in which the standardness
predicate does not occur. ∈w -formulas are also called weak internal formulas, in
opposition to weak external formulas, i.e., those stw-∈w -formulas containing stw.
VI.2. The universe of HST#
Inconsistent set theory HST# deals with eight major types of sets: (i) strongly
external or s-external,(ii) strongly internal or s-internal, (iii) strongly standard or
s-standard, (iv) strongly well-founded or s-well-founded,(v) weakly external or
w-external,(vi) weakly internal or w-internal, (vii) weakly well-founded or
w-well-founded.
First of all, strongly standard sets are those consistent sets x which satisfy stsx and
weakly standard sets are those inconsistent sets x which satisfy stwx.Strongly internal
sets are those consistent sets y which satisfy intsy, where intsy is the formula
∃stsxy ∈s x ≡ ∃xstsx ∧ y ∈s x (saying: y strongly belongs to a strongly standard
set), weakly internal sets are those inconsistent sets y which satisfy intwy, where intwy
is the formula ∃stwxy ∈w x (saying: y weakly belongs to a weakly standard set). Thus,
i Ss  x : stsxs is the class of all consistent standard sets,
ii Is  y : intsys  y : ∃stsxy ∈s xs is the class of all consistent internal sets,
iii Sw  x : stwxw is the class of all inconsistent standard sets,
iv Iw  y : intwyw  y : ∃stwxy ∈w xw is the class of all inconsistent internal
sets,
v S#  Ss s Sw  x : stsxs s x : stwxw is the class of all consistent and
inconsistent standard sets,
vi I#  Is s Iw  y : intsys s y : intwyw is the class of all consistent and
inconsistent internal sets.
The class Is is the source of some typical objects of consistent "nonstandard”
mathematics like consistent hyperintegers and consistent hyperreals, the class Iw is
the source of some typical objects of inconsistent "nonstandard” mathematics like
inconsistent hyperintegers and inconsistent hyperreals [],
Blanket agreement 1.1. Thus, internal sets are precisely all sets which are
elements of consistent or inconsistent standard sets. This understanding of the notion
of internality and the associated notions like
I#,∃sts ,∃stw ,∃st# ≡ ∃sts ∨ ∃stw ,∀sts ,∀st# ≡ ∀sts ∧ ∀stw is default throughout this paper. All
exceptions (e.g., when IST# is considered) will be explicitly indicated.
External sets consistent and inconsistent, are simply all sets in the nonstandard
universe of HST# . We shall use H# to denote the class of all consistent and
inconsistent external sets. Thus, H# is the "universe of discourse", the universe of all
sets considered by the theory, including the classWF# of all well-founded sets. WF#
will satisfy all axioms of ZFC# . The class S# of all standard sets {determined by the
predicate st, as above) will be shown to be ∈s -∈w -isomorphic toWF# . In a sense, S#
is an "isomorphic expansion" of WF# into H# . Given that S# is not transitive, I# arises
naturally as the class of all elements of sets in S#. It is viewed as an elementary
extension of S# {in ∈s -∈w - language), and thereby also ofWF# . Finally, H# is a
comprehensive universe in which all these classes coexist in a reasonable common
set theoretic structure, with ∈s -∈w having the natural meaning in all mentioned
universes.
VI.3. The axioms of the external inconsistent universe.
This group includes the ZFC# Extensionality, Pair, Union, Infinity axioms and the
schemata of Separation and Collection (therefore also Replacement, which is a
consequence of Collection, as usual) for all sts-∈s stw-∈w -formulas or for all st#-∈# -
formulas for short.
VI.4. Axioms for standard and internal sets
Notation 4.1. (1).Let quantifiers ∃sts ,∀sts ,∃stw and ∀stw be shortcuts meaning: there
exists a
strongly standard..., for all strongly standard,there exists a weakly standard..., for
all
weakly standard, ..., formally:
(i) ∃stsxx means ∃xstsx ∧ x, (ii) ∀stsxx means ∀xstsx  x,
(iii) ∃stwxx means ∃xstwx ∧ x, (iv) ∀stwxx means ∀xstwx  x.
Quantifiers ∃int and ∀int (meaning there exists an internal ... , for all internal ...) are
introduced similarly. If g, is an E-formula then g,st, the relativization of g to S, is the
for- mula obtained by restriction of all quantifiers in g to the class S, so that all
occurrences of 3 x ... are changed to 3stx ... while all occurrences of V x ... are
changed to ystx .... In other words, g,st says that g is true in S. Rela-tivization g,int,
which displays the truth of an e-formula g in the universe 0, is defined similarly: the
quantifiers 3, V change to 3int, yint. The following axioms specify the behaviour of
standard and internal sets.
Notation 4.2.For all sts-∈s stw-∈w -formulas or for all st#-∈# - formulas for short.
ZFCst# : The collection of all formulas of the form g,st, where g is an e- statement
which is an axiom of ZFC# . In other words, it is postulated that the universe S# is a
ZFC# universe. (Note that the ZFC# axioms are assumed to be formulated as certain
closed ∈# - formulas in this definition.) This is enough to prove the following statement:
Lemma 4.1. (1) Ss ⊆ Is, (2) Sw ⊆ Iw.
Proof.(1) See [18] Lemma 1.1.3.
(2) Let x ∈w Sw. The formula ∃yx ∈w y is a theorem of ZFC# , therefore
∃yx ∈w ystw that is the formula ∃stwyx ∈w y,is true. In other words, x is an element
of a standard set, which means x ∈w Iw.
1.Strong or Consistent Transfer (s-Transfer): ints  sts , where  is an
arbitrary
closed ∈s -formula containing only consistent standard sets as parameters.
To be more exact, Consistent Transfer is the collection of all statements of the form
∀stsx1. . .∀stsxnintsx1, . . . ,xn  stsx1, . . . ,xn
2.Strong Consistent Transitivity of Is : ∀intsx∀yy ∈s x  intsy.
3.Consistent Regularity over Is : For any non empty consistent set X there exists
x ∈s X such that x ∩s X ⊆s Is. (The full Regularity of ZFC requires x ∩s X  s.)
4.Consistent Standardization: ∀X∃stwyX ∩s Ss  ∩s Ss). (Such consistent
standard set
Y, unique by Consistent Transfer and Consistent Extensionality, is sometimes
denoted by SsX. )
5.Weak Transfer (w-Transfer): intw  stw , where  is an arbitrary closed
∈s -∈w -formula containing only consistent and inconsistent standard sets as
parameters.
To be more exact, Weak Transfer is the collection of all statements of the form
∀stsx1. . .∀stsxn∀stwy1. . .∀stwymintsx1, . . . ,xn;y1, . . . ,ym  stwx1, . . . ,xn;y1, . . . ,ym
6.Weak Transitivity of Iw : ∀intsx∀yy ∈w x  intwy.
7.Weak Regularity over Iw : For any non empty consistent set X there exists
x ∈w X such that x ∩w X ⊆w Iw. (The full Regularity of ZFC requires x ∩w X  w.)
8.Strictly Weak Regularity (Strictly w-Regularity): For any non empty
inconsistent
set X there exists x ∈w X such that x ∩w X w w ∧ x ∩w X w w.
9.Weak Standardization (w-Standardization): ∀X∃stwYX ∩w Sw w Y ∩w Sw.
9.Weak Standardization: ∀X∃stwyX ∩w Sw  ∩w Sw). (Such consistent standard
set Y, unique by Consistent Transfer and Consistent Extensionality, is sometimes
denoted by SwX. )
Such inconsistent standard set Y, w-unique by w-Transfer and weak
Extensionality,
is sometimes denoted by SwX.
Remark 4.1. (i) w-Transfer can be considered as saying that: Iw, the universe of all
inconsistent internal sets, is an elementary extension of Sw in the ∈s -∈w -language. It
fo llows, by ZFC# stw , that the class Iw of all inconsistent internal sets satifies ZFC# (in
the ∈s -∈w -language ), in fact, we can replace ZFC# stw by ZFC# intw , with
relativization to Iw, in the list of HST# axioms. See also Theorem 1.3.9 below.
(ii) w-Transitivity of Iw postulates that: inconsistent internal sets to form the
basement of the ∈s -∈w -structure of the universe H# . This axiom is very important
since it implies that some set operations in Iw retain their sense in the whole universe
H# .
(iii) w-Regularity over Iw organizes the HST# set universe H# in general case as a
sort of hierarchy over the internal universe Iw, in the same way as the w-Regularity
axiom organizes the universe in the von Neumann w-hierarchy over the w-empty set
w in ZFC# .
(iv) Strictly w-Regularity organizes the HST# set universe H# in the von Neumann
w-hierarchy over the w-empty set w,but in a strictly inconsistent sense only.
(v) w-Standardization postulates that H# does not contain collections of standard
sets other than those of the form S ∩w Sw for inconsistent standard set S.
Remark 4.2. It well known that the ZFC Regularity fails in H  Hs : the set of all
nonstandard Is-natural numbers does not contain an ∈s -minimal element, (see for
example [18], Exercise 1.2. 15(3)). In contrast with a classical case, ZFC#
w-Regularity valid in H# , but in a strictly inconsistent sense only. For example the set
of all nonstandard Iw-natural contain an inconsistent ∈w -minimal element, see
[22]-[23].
VII.5. Well-founded inconsistent sets.
Now we can introduce the last principal class: well-founded inconsistent sets.
Recall the following notions from general inconsistent set theory.
Definition 5.1. (i) A binary weak relation w on inconsistent set or inconsistent
class X is a strictly well-founded if any nonempty set Y ⊆w X contains consistent
w -minimal w-element x∗ ∈w Y, that is there exists x ∈w Y such that no y ∈w Y satisfies
y w x.
(ii) A binary weak relation w on inconsistent set or inconsistent class X is weakly
well- founded (or w-well-founded) if:
(1) w is not a strictly well-founded and
(2) any nonempty set Y ⊆w X contains a w -minimal w-element x∗ ∈w Y, that is
there exists y ∈w Y satisfies: y w x ∧ x w y, i.e. y w x ∧ y w x.
(iii) Inconsistent set or inconsistent class X is w-transitive if any x ∈w X satisfies
x ⊆w X, i.e., weak elements of weak elements of X are weak elements of X.
(iv) Inconsistent set or inconsistent class X is w-complete if we have y ∈w X
whenever
y ⊆w x ∈w X, that is a weak subsets of weak elements of X are weak elements of
X.
(v) Inconsistent set x is a strictly well-founded if there is a w-transitive set X such
that x ⊆w X and the restriction ∈w  X is a strictly well-founded weak relation.
(vi) Inconsistent set x is w-well-founded if there is a w-transitive set X such that
x ⊆w X and the restriction ∈w  X is a w-well-founded weak relation.
Remark 5.1. It is known that all sets are well-founded in ZFC by the Regularity
axiom.
This is not the case in HST : the set ∗ℕ of all Is-natural numbers is ill-founded [18].
Remark 5.2. In contrast with a classical case, all inconsistent sets are
w-well-founded
in HST# by the Strictly w-Regularity axiom. For example, the set #ℕ  ∗ℕ inc of all
Iw-natural numbers is w-well-founded by the Strictly Weak Regularity axiom.
Definition 5.2.(HST# ). (i) Let s-wfwx mean that x is a strictly well-founded. We put
s-WFw w x : s-wfwxw, the class of all strictly well-founded inconsistent sets and
(ii) let w-wfwx mean that x is a w-well-founded. We put w-WFw w
x : w-wfwxw, the
class of all w-well-founded inconsistent sets.
Notation 5.1.We introduce quantifiers ∃s-wfw ,∀s-wfw ,∃w-wfw and ∀w-wfw (meaning:
there is a well-founded ... , for any well-founded ... ) and the relativization (1) s-wfw to
s-WFw, (2) w-wfw to w-WFw similarly to ∃sts ,∃sts ,sts ,∃stw ,∃stw ,stw in §VII.1.3. In other
words, s-wfw says that gj is true in WIF. The main property of the classes s-WFw and
w-WFw in HST# is that it admits a definable ∈w -isomorphism w #w onto the class S
of all standard sets.
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